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I. INTRODUCTION
The General Accounting Office and the Department of Health and Human
Services (the “DHHS”) recently estimated that Medicare pays $23 billion a year in
fraudulent medical claims.1 Not surprisingly, many health care professionals
consider Medicare fraud and abuse the leading health care issue in 1999.2 To combat
the fraud abuse in the system, Congress has recently enacted several new laws and
given life to some old ones. For example, Congress recently passed the Stark laws3
the 1981 Civil Monetary Penalties Law,4 and the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act.5 In addition, the False Claims Act, originally enacted in 1863
with a qui tam provision, has become a major force in assisting the government in
discovering and prosecuting fraudulent claims.6 Considerable emphasis has also
been placed on prosecuting fraud and abuse under the federal Medicare and

1

HCFA’s $23 Billion Error Rate Said Shows Need for Random Audits, HEALTH L. REP.
(BNA) 24.
2

Survey of Top Health Care Law Issues For 1999, HEALTH L. REP. (BNA), (Dec., 1998).

3

42 U.S.C.A. § 1395nn (West Supp. 1998). The Stark legislation consists of The Ethics in
Patient Referrals Act (Stark I) and The Comprehensive Physician Ownership and Referral Act
of 1993 (Stark II). Stark I prohibits physicians from referring Medicare patients to clinical
laboratories in which the physician has an ownership interest. Stark II expands the prohibition
against physician “self-referral” to services such as: radiology services; prosthetics; home
health services; outpatient prescription drugs; and inpatient and outpatient hospital services.
For a discussion of the Stark Laws, see Jo-Ellyn Sakowitz Klein, Note, The Stark Laws:
Conquering Physician Conflicts of Interest? 87 GEO. L.J. 499 (1998).
4

42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1320a-27a (West 1981). “The 1981 Civil Monetary Penalties Law gives
the Inspector General the authority to seek restitution from anyone who submits a false claim
to Medicare, Medicaid, or any other federally financed health or welfare program. Under [this
law] providers can be fined $2000 per claim and assessed as much as twice the amount of the
claim.” See Civil Monetary Penalties, MOD. HEALTHCARE, Apr. 8, 1991, at 38.
5

Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110
Stat. 1936 (1996). (hereinafter “HIPAA”). HIPAA provided increased funding for the Office
of Inspector General (OIG) and the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) to
investigate fraud and abuse. HIPAA allocated $70 million to the OIG, money which the
Office plans to hire 250 additional investigators, auditors, attorneys and other experts. See
Colleen Faddick, Health Care Fraud And Abuse: New Weapons, New Penalties, And New
Fears for Providers Created by the Health Insurance Portability And Accountability Act of
1996 (“HIPAA”), 6 ANNALS HEALTH L. 77 (1997).
6
31 U.S.C.A. §§ 3729-3733 (1995). The False Claims Act (FCA) prohibits individuals
from knowingly submitting a false claim to the government for money. The FCA was
originally enacted prevent contractor fraud perpetrated on the Union Army during the Civil
War. Under the FCA, the U.S. Attorney General can bring a civil suit against an individual
for filing a false claim against the government. The qui tam provisions of the FCA enable
private individuals to sue those perpetrating fraud against the government. The FCA
provisions encourage individuals to report fraud by allowing private citizens to share in the
government’s recovery after the defendant is successfully prosecuted or settles. See, Kaz
Kikkawa, Medicare Fraud and Abuse and Qui Tam: The Dynamic Duo or the Odd Couple, 8
HEALTH MATRIX 83 (1998).
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Medicaid anti-kickback statute.7 This Note examines the recent split in federal
courts’ interpretation of the scienter requirement of the anti-kickback statute and how
the Supreme Court’s recent definition of “willfully” in Bryan v. United States,8 will
impact the mens rea requirement for conviction under the anti-kickback statute.
State and federal anti-kickback laws aim to prohibit the exchange of
remuneration for referrals of patients, goods, or services under publicly funded
health care programs. The premise of these laws is if a medical professional has a
financial incentive for referring patients, he is more likely to increase the number of
services performed. This incentive, in turn, will lead to an overutilization of
services, the unnecessarily depletion of program funds, and a waste of taxpayer
dollars.9 Although many state laws contain similar provisions, this Note focuses
solely on the federal Medicare and Medicaid anti-kickback statute.10
The anti-kickback statute has been the source of much controversy. Supporters
of the law argue that it is necessary to punish providers who would contribute to the
nation’s spiraling health care costs by placing profit over the best interests of their
patients. On the other hand, medical providers fear that the anti-kickback laws will
punish “innocent” referral arrangements used throughout the industry. Furthermore,
it has been argued that these arrangements may ultimately save taxpayers dollars
because of the efficiencies which they create. 11 For example, if a hospital owns a
management service organization (MSO) that furnishes support services to a

7

As presently amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320a-7b(b)(1) and (2). For purposes of brevity,
the Medicare and Medicaid anti-kickback statute will be referred to herein as the “antikickback statute.”
8

Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184 (1998).

9
See James F. Blumstein, The Fraud and Abuse in an Evolving Health Care Marketplace:
Life in the Health Care Speakeasy, 22 Am. J.L. & Med. 205, 209 (1996). This article
describes a significant number of studies, primarily from Jean M. Mitchell and Elton Scott,
that showes when physicians had an ownership interest or a compensation arrangement with
an ancillary facility, the patients of these physicians had higher utilization rates than did the
patients of other physicians.
10

42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1320a-7b(b)(1) and (2) (1994). See discussion infra Sections II A and II

B.
11

See Blumstein, supra note 9:
The fraud and abuse statute, enacted before capitation had a large market presence,
clearly contemplates a world of fee for service (FFS) payment driving excessive
utilization and escalating program costs. While this concern remains realistic in much
of the market, the fraud and abuse law suffers from a case of hardening of the
intellectual arteries because it does not adequately accommodate the evolving marketdriven reforms in the health care arena. Indeed, fraud and abuse law can serve as an
obstacle to the rationalization of the health care marketplace.
See also David A. Hyman & Joel V. Williamson, Fraud and Abuse: Regulatory Alternatives
in a “Competitive” Health Care Era, 19 LOY. U. CHI. L.J., 1133, 1135 (1988).
Although the statute was an effective and logical response to fraud and abuse under a
cost-based system, it may be inappropriate to apply the same rules to the newly
competitive health care environment. The statute is broadly worded and appears to
prohibit many arrangements that pose little risk to the integrity of the [Medicare and
Medicaid] program or the quality of medical care.
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physician practice, the hospital may be in violation of the anti-kickback statute if it
charges less than the fair market value for the services it provides to the MSO on the
theory that such savings are “remuneration” to induce referrals.12
At the forefront of the debate over the anti-kickback statute, and the topic of this
Note, is the mens rea, or mental state, that is required for a violation of the law.
According to the statute, an individual must “knowingly and willfully” solicit or
receive, or offer or pay, remuneration in order to induce business reimbursed under
any federal health care program.13 The interpretation of these terms by the federal
courts has varied wildly, as have the underlying Supreme Court cases cited as
precedent for such interpretations. However, in June of 1998, the Supreme Court
defined the meaning of “willfully” under a federal criminal statute in Bryan v. United
States.14 Although the criminal statute in Bryan was unrelated to health care fraud,
the Eleventh Circuit has adopted the Bryan Court’s definition of “willfully” in a case
involving the anti-kickback statute.15 Whether Bryan will resolve the split between
the circuit courts is unclear; however, this case is certain to significantly influence
the debate.
The following Section of this Note briefly summarizes the legislative
development of the federal anti-kickback statute including the 1980 amendment
adding the mens rea requirement. Section II also summarizes the 1996 amendment
requiring that the Secretary of the DHHS (Department of Health and Human
Services) issue advisory opinions in response to requests for guidance about whether
specific business arrangements are within the limits of the anti-kickback statute.
Section III examines the various federal court interpretations of the mens rea
requirement of the statute. As described in this Section, there is a split of authority
as to the meaning of the word “willfully” under the statute. Because the Supreme
Court has not interpreted the meaning of the mens rea requirement of the antikickback statute, this Section also examines the principal cases that have defined
“willfully” in the context of other federal criminal statutes, that have been relied
upon in interpreting the anti-kickback statute. Section IV analyzes Bryan v. United
States, where the Supreme Court defined “willfully” under the Firearms Owners’
Protection Act, as acting with a “bad purpose” or with the intent to do something
which the law forbids.16 Section V analyzes United States v. Starks, the first, and to
date only, circuit court decision to interpret the mens rea standard of the statute in
light of the Bryan decision. Section VI analyzes the alternative interpretations of the
mens rea standard of the anti-kickback statute, and the reasons that federal courts
will likely adopt the Bryan court’s definition of “willfully.” Finally, this Note
concludes, that, despite its factual distinction from health care fraud and abuse
12

Blumstein, supra note 9, at 217.

13

HIPAA § 204(a)(7). “Federal health care program” is defined as “any plan or program
that provides health benefits, whether directly, through insurance, or otherwise, which is
funded directly, in whole or in part, by the United States Government,” or “any State health
care program, as defined in section 1128(h).” HIPAA, Pub.L.No. 104-91, Section 204(a)(7),
110 Stat. 1936, 2000 (1996).
14

Bryan, 524 U.S. at 184.

15

United States v. Starks, 157 F.3d 833 (11th Cir. 1998).

16

Id.
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litigation, the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Bryan will greatly impact the
current debate about the proper interpretation of “willfully” under the anti-kickback
statute.
II. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ANTI-KICKBACK STATUTE
A. Background
The federal anti-kickback statute was first enacted as part of the Social Security
Amendments of 1972,17 and was primarily concerned with outlawing health care
referrals that were considered unethical or inappropriate. Specifically, the statute
made it a misdemeanor for any individual to furnish, solicit, offer or receive any
kickback, bribe or rebate in connection with any item or service for which payment
could be made under the Medicare and Medicaid programs. A violation of the
statute was punishable by a fine of up to $10,000, a maximum term of imprisonment
of one year, or both.18
Shortly after its enactment, several key issues arose regarding the statute’s
interpretation.19 First, it did not appear that a mens rea, or mental culpability, was
required for a violation of the statute.20 Second, it was unclear what types of
business arrangements—particularly joint venture arrangements that were beginning
to develop in the health care industry—were precluded by the statute.21 Finally,
terms such as “kickback,” “bribe” and “rebate” were not defined in the statute.
These uncertainties led to conflicting court interpretations of the statute.
Consequently, government prosecutors were unsure what arrangements would be
construed as a kickback and health care providers had little assurance that their
commercial arrangements were properly structured.
In response to these issues, Congress enacted the Medicare and Medicaid AntiFraud and Abuse Amendments of 1977 (MMAAA).22 The amendments both
expanded and narrowed the reach of the statute. Congress expanded the reach of the
statute by substituting the phrase “any remuneration” for the terms “rebates,”
“bribes” and “kickbacks.”23 In addition, a violation of the statute was increased to
felony status, and the penalties were raised to a maximum fine of up to $25,000 per
violation and/or five years’ imprisonment.24 The legislative history of the MMAAA
indicates that these amendments were intended to be read broadly in favor of the
17

Social Security Amendments Act, Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 242(b), 86 Stat. 1329, 1419-20
(1972).
18

Id.

19

See TIMOTHY S. JOST & SHARON DAVIES, MEDICARE AND MEDICAID FRAUD AND ABUSE
§§ 88-92 (1998) (providing a detailed discussion of conflicting judicial views of the
interpretation of the 1972 anti-kickback statute).
20

Id.

21

Id.

22

Medicare and Medicaid Anti-Fraud and Abuse Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95142, § 4(b)(1), 91 Stat. 1175, 1180 (1977).
23

Id.

24

Id.
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government.25 On the other hand, concern that the provisions of the statute could be
construed to punish innocent business transactions likely motivated the adoption of
two exceptions to the statute. First, the scope of the statute was narrowed to exclude
the practice of discounts or other price reductions.26 Second, payments made to
employees under a bona fide employment relationship were also excluded from the
reach of the anti-kickback statute.27
Instead of resolving the controversy over the interpretation and application of the
anti-kickback statute, the 1977 amendments caused considerable worry among the
health care industry due to their potential breadth. Again, it was argued that a broad
construction of the provisions of the statute (especially the undefined phrase “any
remuneration”) would result in punishing not only those who had engaged in
wrongful conduct, but also those providers whose conduct was innocent and socially
beneficial.28
B. The “Willfully” Mens Rea Requirement
In 1980, Congress amended the anti-kickback statute by adding a mens rea
element. Specifically, the amendment added the requirement that an individual must
engage in the proscribed conduct “knowingly and willfully” to be convicted under
the statute.29 The House Budget Committee Report pointed out that the purpose of
the revision was to ensure that those whose conduct may have been improper would
nonetheless not be prosecuted unless they specifically intended to engage in the
proscribed conduct.30 This same mens rea element exists in the anti-kickback statute
today.
The mens rea requirement was added to quiet fears of unwarranted prosecution
under the statute. However, as discussed below, the interpretation and application of
the requirement has been the source of considerable debate and controversy.
The 1980 amendment adding the mens rea requirement was the last amendment
to the prohibitive provisions of the anti-kickback statute. Thus, the statute currently
provides:
(1) Whoever knowingly and willfully solicits or receives any
remuneration (including any kickback, bribe, or rebate) directly or
indirectly, overtly or covertly, in cash or in kind–

25

See JOST & DAVIES, supra note 17, at § 94.

26

Id.

27

42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1320a-7b(b)(3)(A) and (B) (1994).

28

See JOST & DAVIS, supra note 17, at §§ 94-95 (citing David M. Frankford, Creating and
Dividing the Fruits of Collective Economic Activity: Referrals Among Health Care Providers,
89 COLUM. L. REV. 1861, 1875-76 (December 1989).
29

See, Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-499, § 917, 94 Stat. 2599,
2625 (1980).
30
Robert Salcido, Mixing Oil and Water: The Government’s Mistaken Use of the Medicare
Anti-Kickback Statute in False Claims Act Prosecutions, 6 ANNALS HEALTH L. 105, 113
(1997).
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(A) in return for referring an individual to a person for the furnishing or
arranging of any item or service for which payment may be made in
whole or in part under a Federal health care program, . . . or
(B) in return for purchasing, leasing, ordering, or arranging for or
recommending purchasing, leasing, or ordering any good, facility, service,
or item for which payment may be made in whole or in part under a
Federal health care program, shall be guilty of a felony…31
(2) Whoever knowingly and willfully offers or pays any remuneration
(including any kickback, bribe, or rebate) directly or indirectly, overtly or
covertly, in cash or in kind to any person to induce such person–
(A) to refer an individual to a person for the furnishing or arranging for
the furnishing of any item or service for which payment may be made in
whole or in part under [a Federal health care program], or
(B) to purchase, lease, order, or arrange for or recommend purchasing,
leasing, or ordering any good, facility, service, or item for which payment
may be made in whole or in part under a Federal health care program,
shall be guilty of a felony…32
C. Further Amendments to the Statute
The anti-kickback statute was further amended in 1987 to establish statutory
exceptions to the law. These exceptions included, among others, the so-called “safe
harbors.”33 The safe harbor provisions were designed to assist health care providers
in understanding the legal limits of the anti-kickback statute.34
In 1996, as part of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act,
Congress mandated that the Secretary of DHHS (Health and Human Services) (the
“Secretary”) publish for comment and consider for final rulings any appropriate
modifications to existing safe harbors, as well as promulgate additional safe harbor
provisions.35 The Secretary must also issue advisory opinions explaining: the
meaning of “remuneration”; whether a transaction is legal under the statute; what
constitutes “an inducement to reduce or limit services” as prohibited by the statute,

31
Social Security Act § 1128B(b)(1), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1320a-7b (b)(1)(A) and (B) (West
Supp. 1997).
32

Social Security Act § 1128B(b)(2), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1320a-7b (b)(2)(A) and (B) (West
Supp. 1997).
33

Medicare and Medicaid Patient and Program Protection Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 10093, §§ 4, 14, 101 Stat. 680, 688-89, 697-98 (1987).
34
See generally, Aaron M. Altschuler, et al., Health Care Fraud, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
841 (1998); and Brian A. Kaser, Sailing Without Safe Harbors: Physician Recruitment and the
Law of Fraud and Abuse, 9 (3) HEALTH SPAN 9 (1992).
35

HIPAA, § 205, 110 Stat. at 2000.
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and whether an activity is subject to sanctions.36 Also under the HIPAA, the Office
of the Inspector General (the “OIG”) must issue special fraud alerts in response to a
request for guidance when the Secretary deems it to be appropriate.37 Finally,
HIPAA required the Secretary to issue advisory opinions in response to requests for
guidance about whether a specific business arrangement violates the anti-kickback
law.38 The Secretary must issue an advisory opinion within 60 days of the receipt of
a request, and the opinion is binding on both the Secretary and the party requesting
the opinion.39
These 1996 amendments were motivated by Congress’ belief that the Secretary’s
clarification would enable prosecutors to spend their time on the more egregious
types of conduct. Congress also reasoned that while providers want to comply with
the abuse statute, many are unsure of how the statute affects them and will, therefore,
need to receive guidance from the government.40
III. JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE MENS REA REQUIREMENT OF THE ANTIKICKBACK STATUTE
A. Introduction
As described above, the anti-kickback statute applies only to those acts that are
performed “knowingly and willfully.” Circuit courts have split (or arguably
splintered) on the precise meaning of these words, and particularly the word
“willfully,” in the context of the anti-kickback statute. This Section begins with a
brief review of the primary interpretations of the word “willfully” in the context of
federal criminal statutes. Following this review is an examination of the principal
cases that have addressed the meaning of “knowingly and willfully” in the context of
the anti-kickback statute, including the underlying cases cited in support these
interpretations. The most recent case to define “knowingly and willfully” in the
context of the anti-kickback statute, United States v. Starks, which was decided after
United States v. Bryan, is discussed in Section V.

36

Id. at § 205, 110 Stat. at 2002.

37

Id. at § 205. 110 Stat. at 2003.

38

Id. at § 205, 110 Stat. at 2001-2002. Under the direction of the Attorney General, the
Secretary of DHHS (Health and Human Services) will issue advisory opinions about (1) what
constitutes prohibited remuneration under the anti-kickback laws; (2) whether an arrangement
falls within one of the statutory exceptions to the anti-kickback law; (3) whether an
arrangement falls within an applicable safe harbor established by the OIG; (4) what constitutes
an inducement to reduce or limit services; and (5) whether a particular activity constitutes
grounds for penalties under the anti-kickback law, civil monetary law, or exclusion statutes.
The OIG must accept requests for advisory opinions between February 21, 1997 and August
21, 2000.
39

See, JOST & DAVIS, supra note 19, at §§ 3-13.

40

Id.
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B. The Meaning of “Willfully” in Federal Criminal Statutes
The mens rea term “willfully” is often said to be “a word of many meanings,”
whose construction varies based on the context in which it appears.41 Federal courts
have generally interpreted “willfully” in one of three ways. The first interpretation
merely requires that the person act “knowingly” or “purposely,”42 which is to say
that the actions are intentional rather than accidental.43 Under this interpretation,
willful does not require an evil motive.44 The Model Penal Code adopts a similar
interpretation of “willfulness” and provides that the mens rea is satisfied by the
person acting “knowingly.”45
The second interpretation of “willfully” generally requires a culpable state of
mind,46 or proof that the act was committed with the specific intent to commit an
unlawful act.47 Rather than merely committing the act “knowingly,” the actor must
also know the conduct is wrongful. Thus, courts frequently describe this mens rea
standard as requiring proof of a “bad purpose.”48 This interpretation of “willfully”
has been described by one circuit court as a “middle standard”49 and will be
referenced as such throughout this Note.
The third interpretation of “willfully” requires that the person violate a known
legal duty. This interpretation is considered to be a “heightened” mens rea standard
because as it requires proof that the person knows the law that he or she is charged
with violating. In cases where this standard has been applied, courts have generally
not required the defendant to know the specifics of the law, but he or she must be
familiar with the law.50 Because this interpretation imposes such a heavy burden on
the government, its application has generally been limited to cases where a person
might become innocently engaged in conduct that is not inherently evil.51 As one

41

Bryan, 524 U.S. at 191.

42

People v. Lee, 229 Cal. App. 3d 1504, 1508 (1981) (The word “willfully,” when used in
a criminal statute, implies that a person knows what he is doing and intends to do what he is
doing.); In re Jerry R, 29 Cal. App. 4th 438 (1987) (The term “willful” requires only that the
prohibited act occur intentionally).
43

Commonwealth v. Cimino, 611 N.E.2d 738, 741 (Mass. 1993).

44

Commonwealth v. Luna, 641 N.E.2d 1050, 1053 (Mass. 1994).

45

Model Penal Code § 2.02(8).

46
See Bryan, 524 U.S. at 191. (Defining “willfully” in the context of the federal antistructuring laws. This case is discussed in detail in Section IV, herein).
47

United States v. Muthana, 60 F.3d 1217, 1222 (7th Cir. 1995).

48

United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 396 (1933) (“[W]hen used in a criminal statute
[willfully] generally means an act done with a bad purpose.”); Felton v. United State, 96 U.S.
699, 702 (1877) (“Doing or omitting to do a thing knowingly and willfully, implies not only a
knowledge of the thing, but a determination with a bad intent to do it or to omit doing it”).
49

United States v. Jain, 93 F.3d 436, 440 (8th Cir. 1996). This case is discussed in detail
in Section III herein.
50

Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192 (1991).

51

Id. at 200.
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court described, the definition of “willfully” as “intentionally, deliberately, and
knowingly” is appropriate for statutes criminalizing conduct that is inherently
wrongful, or malum in se, whereas the heightened definition is appropriate for
statutes criminalizing conduct that is not inherently nefarious, or malum
prohibitum.52
The common law maxim that “ignorance of the law is not a defense” generally
applies to the first two interpretations of “willfully.” Although courts have made
exceptions to this general principle,53 persons are usually presumed to know the
law.54 However, under the heightened mens rea standard, ignorance of the law
becomes a defense because the accused must be shown to know the law. If the
person can demonstrate ignorance of the law, then that person cannot be convicted
where the mens rea requires violation of a known legal duty.55
The definition given to a mens rea element in criminal law, like the degree of
scrutiny in constitutional law, will often determine the outcome of a case. As
described in the following Section, federal courts have split between the “middle
standard” and the “heightened standard” in interpreting the meaning of the word
“willfully” in the context of the anti-kickback statute. The different definitions that
have been adopted affect the criminal intent the government must prove, the defenses
available to the defendant, and consequently, the outcome of the case.
C. The Heightened Mens Rea Standard
1. Hanlester Network v. Shalala
In the much-publicized case of Hanlester Network v. Shalala,56 the Ninth Circuit
held that “knowingly and willfully” under the anti-kickback statute required the
government to prove that the defendant had (1) a knowledge of the law and (2)
engaged in the “prohibited conduct with the specific intent to disobey the law.”57
This requirement, that the defendant violate a known legal duty, can be referred to as
a “heightened” mens rea standard, and is generally limited to instances where a
defendant might innocently be ensnared in a complex legal arrangement.58
The Hanlester Network was the general partner of three limited partnership
laboratories in California. Physicians in areas nearby the labs, who were in a

52

State v. Azneer, 526 N.W.2d 298, 299 (Iowa 1995).

53

See State v. Guice, 621 A.2d 553 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law. Div. 1993) (holding that the
general rule does not apply to cases where it would be counterproductive).
54

State v. Brumback, 671 N.E.2d 1064, 1070 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996).

55

See Rachael Simonoff, Ratzlaf v. United States: The Meaning of “Willful” and the
Demands of Due Process, 28 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 397 (Spring 1995); Lindsey H.
Simon, The Supreme Court’s Interpretation of the Word “Willful”: Ignorance of the Law as
an Excuse to Prosecutions for Structuring Currency Transactions, 85 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1161 (1995); and Michael L. Travers, Mistake of Law in Mala Prohibita
Crimes, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1301 (1995).
56

51 F.3d 1390 (9th Cir. 1995).

57

Id. at 1400.

58

See Cheek, 498 U.S. 192 (1991); and Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135 (1994).
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position to refer substantial quantities of tests to the labs, were sold limited
partnership shares in the enterprise. The Hanlester Network contracted with Smith
Kline Beecham Clinical Laboraties, Inc. (SKBL) to operate the laboratories. Under
the terms of the agreement, 85 to 90 percent of the tests the physicians ordered were
sent to SKBL laboratories. OIG on behalf of DHHS alleged that Hanlester Network
violated the anti-kickback statute by offering and paying remuneration to the
physician-investors in exchange for referrals, and by soliciting and receiving
remuneration from SKBL in exchange for referrals.59
The Ninth Circuit unanimously disagreed with the government’s assertions, and
affirmed the physician joint-venture arrangement. The Court held that the
“knowingly and willfully” anti-kickback standard requires the government to prove
that litigants both (1) know that the statute “prohibits offering or paying
remuneration to induce referrals, and (2) engage in prohibited conduct with the
specific intent to disobey the law.”60 In applying this standard to the facts in
Hanlester Network, the court noted that the partnership arrangement was a common
joint venture arrangement and that the Network did not knowingly and willfully
violate the law. The court further reasoned that because dividends were paid to the
limited partners based on the number of ownership shares rather than the number of
lab referrals, and because they did not conceal their payments, they did not believe
that their arrangement was unlawful.61
In reaching its interpretation of “knowingly and willfully,” the Ninth Circuit
relied primarily on the legislative history of the statute and the Supreme Court’s
definition of “willfully” in Ratzlaf.62 The Ninth Circuit determined that Congress
used the phrase “knowingly and willfully” to prevent prosecution of those whose
conduct “while improper, was inadvertent.”63 As discussed above, there is evidence
for this interpretation in that the mens rea element was added in the 1980
amendments to the statute. The Ratzlaf case relied on by the court is discussed
below.
Following the Ninth Circuit’s ruling, the Department of Health and Human
Services requested that the Solicitor General appeal the decision to the Supreme
Court. The Inspector General refused this request due to a lack of conflict among
judicial circuits.64
2. Ratzlaf v. United States
In Ratzlaf v. United States,65 the Supreme Court concluded that “willfully,” in the
context of federal anti-structuring laws, requires knowledge of the law and the
59

Hanlester, 51 F.3d at 1394-95.
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Id. at 1400.
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Id. at 1400-1401.
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Id. at 1400.
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Hanlester, 51 F.3d at 1399 n.16 (quoting H.R. 96-1167, 96th Cong. (1980)).
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Department of Justice Refuses to Ask for Supreme Court Review of Hanlester AntiKickback Case, 5 BNA HEALTH L. REP. 6 d14 (Feb. 8, 1996) (Cited in JOST & DAVIS, supra
note 17, at § 3-13).
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specific intent to violate the law.66 Ratzlaf relied on Cheek v. United States67 where
the Supreme Court held that in cases involving complex statutory schemes (such as
the federal tax code) knowledge of the law is required to avoid penalizing innocent
behavior.
In Ratzlaf, the defendant owed a casino $160,000 for a gambling debt that he
incurred one evening at the blackjack table. Aware that banks must report certain
currency transactions over $10,000 to the Internal Revenue Service, Mr. Ratzlaf
obtained multiple cashier’s checks in amounts slightly less than the limit, to pay for
his losses. Ratzlaf was charged however, with “structuring” his transactions to evade
bank reporting requirements, which is a separate violation from the bank reporting
law that he was aware. The federal structuring law requires “willful” conduct, and
Ratzlaf argued that his knowledge of the bank reporting laws was not sufficient to
convict him of violating the structuring law. The Supreme Court agreed with
Ratzlaf, and held that the mens rea element of the statute required the government to
prove that he actually knew of structuring law and acted in violation of the law.68
The Hanlester Network/Ratzlaf approach turns the American legal maxim
“ignorance of the law is no excuse” on its head, and permits a person who is ignorant
of the anti-kickback law to avoid conviction under it. Furthermore, under
Hanlester/Ratzlaf, a defendant must not only know of the statute, but must also be
shown to intend to violate the law, in order to be convicted. Because it sets a very
high burden for conviction under the anti-kickback statute, the Hanlester Network
decision has been applauded and criticized by health law scholars.69
3. The Aftermath of Hanlester–The Caremark Decision
The heightened mens rea standard adopted in Hanlester was applied by a
Minnesota district court in United States v. Caremark.70 In Caremark, three home
health care executives were accused of paying kickbacks to a physician in exchange
for prescribing a Caremark growth hormone. The district court granted defendants’
motion for acquittal because the government had not met the Hanlester standard of
proof that defendants knew their conduct violated the anti-kickback law.71
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Id. at 149.
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498 U.S. 192 (1991).
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Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 136-140.
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See Tamsen Douglas Love, Toward a Fair and Practical Definition of “Willfully” in the
Medicare/Medicaid Anti Kickback Statute, 50 VAND. L. REV. 1029 (May 1997); and Brian J.
Hennigan & Arif Alikhan, Willfulness Under the Medicare Anti-Kickback Statutes: The
Continuing Debate Over Whether Ignorance of the Law is a Defense in Medicare
Prosecutions, A.B.A. CENTER FOR CONT. LEGAL ED. NAT’L INST. (Criminal Justice Section,
March 6-7, 1997) (critiquing Hanlester Network); and William R. Kucera, Jr., Hanlester
Network v. Shalala: A Model Approach to the Medicare and Medicaid Kickback Problem, 91
NW. U. L. REV. 413 (1996); and Andrea Tuwiner Vavonese, The Medicare Anti-Kickback
Provision of the Social Security Act—Is Ignorance of the Law an Excuse for Fraudulent and
Abusive Use of the System?, 45 CATH. U. L. REV. 943 (1996) (in defense of Hanlester).
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The Caremark case illustrates the rigorous burden Hanlester places on the
government to win a conviction under the anti-kickback statute. Other circuit courts
however, have rejected the heightened mens rea standard, opting instead for a lesser
standard of culpability.
D. The “Middle” Mens Rea Standard
When the government was defeated in the Ninth Circuit in Hanlester Network, its
strategy was to aggressively contest its application in other circuit courts rather than
appealing to the Supreme Court.72 This strategy proved to be a success as the
heightened mens rea standard of Hanlester was rejected at the appellate level in
every circuit outside of the Ninth Circuit. This section examines three of the
principal cases that focused on the mens rea standard of the anti-kickback statute. As
described below, the courts in each of these cases adopted a “middle” mens rea
standard that required less culpability than the heightened standard of
Hanlester/Ratzlaf.
1. United States v. Jain
The Eighth Circuit was the first federal appellate court to address the mens rea
requirement of the anti-kickback statute in the wake of Hanlester. The Eighth
Circuit rejected the Ninth Circuit’s requirement that the defendant know the law, and
instead held that “willfully” means the defendant knew his conduct was wrongful.
In United States v. Jain,73 Dr. Jain, a psychologist who operated an outpatient
therapy clinic, was charged with receiving payments from a psychiatric hospital in
return for patient referrals to the hospital.74 Dr. Jain testified that the payments he
received were for mental health workshops he provided and that it would be
“stupid,” “illegal,” “unethical” and “wrong” to ever request money for referrals.75
Two former hospital administrators testified against Dr. Jain, and a jury found him
guilty of violating the anti-kickback statute.76
Both the government and Dr. Jain cited Cheek in support of the mens rea
standard for “willfully”. The government argued that the general rule is that
“willfully” in a criminal statute “refers to consciousness of the act but not the
consciousness that the act is unlawful.”77 Dr. Jain argued that the Cheek (and
Ratzlaf) exceptions to the general rule–that a defendant must violate a “known legal
duty”–was the proper interpretation of “willfully.”78 The Eighth Circuit affirmed the
district court’s definition that “the word ‘willfully’ means unjustifiably and
wrongfully, known to be such by the defendant…”79 The appellate court found the
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See William R. Kucera, Jr., supra note 64 at 446.
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93 F.3d 436 (8th Cir. 1996).
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anti-kickback statute shared the complexity of the anti-structuring laws in Ratzlaf, as
both potentially criminalize conduct that is not “inevitably nefarious.”80 However,
the Court distinguished the Ratzlaf interpretation of willfully because the antistructuring statute at issue in that case referred to a willful violation of another
statute, and the court reasoned that one cannot willfully violate a statute without
knowing the conduct proscribed by the statute. In contrast, in the anti-kickback
statute, the word “willfully” specifically modifies the receipt or payment of
remuneration. For this reason, the Court concluded that the proper mens rea standard
is proof that the defendant “knew his conduct was wrongful, rather than proof that he
knew it violated ‘a known legal duty.’”81
In adopting a “middle ground”, the Jain court rejected the Hanlester
Network/Ratzlaf mens rea construction. According to Jain, the government is not
required to prove the defendant knew the law or had the specific intent to violate the
law; rather, it is sufficient to prove that defendant knew the conduct was wrongful.
This standard maintains that ignorance of the law is not a defense, but that “good
faith” conduct is.82
2. United States v. Davis
In United States v. Davis,83 the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s jury
instructions that “willfully” means to disobey the law or to act with the specific
intent to do something the law forbids.84 In reaching the decision, the Fifth Circuit
adopted a middle position similar to the standard set for forth by the Eighth Circuit in
Jain.
In Davis, the defendant was charged with conspiracy to offer and pay
inducements for Medicare patient referrals in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, and for
offering and paying such inducements in violation of the anti-kickback statute.85
Davis appealed his conviction on two grounds. First, he argued that the district court
erred in failing to instruct the jury that it could convict him only if it found that his
payments to a physician were “for no other purpose” than “inducing the referral of
Medicare patients.”86 The appellate court held that this decision or holding was an
erroneous statement of the law and was properly rejected. The court found that it
was only necessary that the payments be in part an inducement to violate the law. 87
Second, Davis claimed that the district court failed to properly instruct the jury
regarding the mens rea terms “knowingly” and “willfully” and that the jury should
have received his requested instruction concerning good faith.88 The appeals court
80

Jain, 93 F.3d at 440.
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rejected this argument because it found that the district court’s definitions of
“knowingly” and “willfully” adequately explained the concept of good faith.89
Citing Hanlester Network, Davis argued, however, that the anti-kickback statute
contained a “heightened scienter requirement” and that the district court’s definitions
were therefore inadequate.90 The district court had instructed the jury that
“knowingly” means that the act was committed “voluntarily and intentionally, not
because of mistake or accident,” and that “willfully” means that the act was done
“voluntarily and purposely with the specific intent to do something the law forbids;
that is to say, with bad purpose either to disobey or disregard the law.”91 The Fifth
Circuit approved of these definitions, but stated that it was not deciding whether the
anti-kickback statute included a heightened mens rea standard.92
In reaching its decision, the Fifth Circuit incorrectly read Hanlester as requiring
only that the defendant knows that the conduct in question is unlawful.93 As noted
above, the heightened mens rea standard of Hanlester requires knowledge of the law
as well as the specific intent to violate the law. Therefore, while the Davis court did
not explicitly decide whether the anti-kickback statute included a heightened mens
rea standard, it implicitly rejected its requirement that the defendant know the law
that he or she is charged with violating. In so doing, the Fifth Circuit adopted a
standard similar to the Eighth Circuit’s “middle standard” in Jain.
3. United States v. Neufeld
In United States v. Neufeld,94 a federal district court refused to adopt the Ratzlaf
and Hanslester definitions of “willful” which required that a defendant know that his
conduct was illegal. Rather, the court interpreted “willful” as the purpose to commit
a wrongful act.95
In this case, Dr. Neufeld, who had been licensed to practice medicine in the State
of Ohio since 1975, contracted with a home infusion company to act as a consultant
to the company in its development of treatment and educational programs for its staff
and patients.96 Dr. Neufeld was paid by the company for services performed under
the consulting agreements.97 Based on these payments, Dr. Neufeld was indicted for
conspiracy to violate and the violation of the anti-kickback statute.98
Interpreting the anti-kickback statute, the court declined to provide an exact
definition of the scienter requirement. However, it rejected the Ratzlaf definition of
89
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90

Id.

91

Id. (citing United States v. Garcia, 762 F.2d 1222, 1224 (5th Cir. 1985) (approving
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“willful” and adopted a formulation of the term which takes into account the purpose
to commit a wrongful act.99 The court reasoned that, unlike the structuring in
Ratzlaf, taking bribes for referrals is an inherently wrongful activity of which a
physician should be aware. Thus, the scienter requirement in the anti-kickback
statute is satisfied by mere purposeful conduct, negating the need for the heightened
scienter requirement adopted in Ratzlaf.100
E. Summary of the Judicial Constructions of the “Willfully” Mens Rea Requirement
The government’s defeat in Hanlester proved to be short-lived, as other federal
courts refused to adopt the heightened mens rea standard, choosing instead to
interpret “willfully” as something short of violating a known legal duty. The Eighth
Circuit Court in Jain, ruled that since the anti-kickback statute prohibited what
would otherwise be innocent conduct, it required a more rigorous mens rea standard
than a mere consciousness of the act. However, the court distinguished the antikickback statute from the anti-structuring statute in Ratzlaf, and refused the appeal
on the grounds that the defendant must know the law in order to be convicted of
violating the statute.101 The Eighth Circuit approved of the district court’s “middle
ground” interpretation that “willfully” means “unjustifiably and wrongfully, known
to be such by the defendant.”102
In Davis, the Fifth Circuit court adopted a scienter requirement that could
likewise be considered a “middle” standard as it required more than mere awareness
of the act, but less than knowledge of the law. The court affirmed the district court
definition that “willfully” is an act “committed voluntarily and purposely with the
specific intent to do something the law forbids; that is to say, with bad purpose either
to disobey or disregard the law.”103 At first glance, this definition appears to be
consistent with the heightened mens rea standard, however it is possible for a person
to intentionally do something which the law forbids, without actually knowing the
law. Therefore, while Davis may arguably require a greater level of culpability than
Jain (although it is doubtful that a juror would perceive such subtle differences), it
still falls within the same “middle” standard mens rea.
Similarly, in Neufeld, the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Ohio adopted a “middle” standard that “takes into account the purpose to commit a
wrongful act.”104 The court declined to follow Hanlester/Ratzlaf for two reasons.
99
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Id. As noted above, the Eighth Circuit distinguished the anti-kickback statute from the
anti-structuring statute on the basis that the mens rea requirement in the anti-kickback statute
referenced a separate provision of the law. As the Jain court noted: “The statute at issue in
Ratzlaf made criminal a willful violation of another anti-structuring statute. Because one
cannot willfully violate a statute without knowing what the statute prohibits, the Supreme
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series of prohibited acts.” Jain, 93 F.3d at 441.
102

Jain, 93 F.3d at 440.

103

Davis, 132 F.3d at 1094.

104

Neufeld, 908 F. Supp. at 497.

1999-2000]

DEFINING “WILLFUL” REMUNERATION

287

First, the court claimed that unlike the anti-structuring statute, the anti-kickback
statute did not have parallel criminal and penalty provisions which required that a
person know the law that related to the penalty provision.105 Second, the court found
that Doctor Neufeld’s taking bribes for referrals was not the type of innocent
behavior that the heightened standard was intended to protect against. The Neufeld
court declined to provide an exact definition of “willfully,” but relied on Jain for its
“wrongful act” formulation.106
Jain, Davis, and Neufeld suggest that the “middle standard” represents the
majority view of the scienter requirement of the anti-kickback statute. However,
because the Supreme Court has not ruled on the issue, the “heightened standard”
established in Hanlester is still good law. Furthermore, the Ratzlaf case, which was
the basis for Hanlester, suggests that the Supreme Court has broadened the scope of
the heightened mens rea standard beyond its narrow holding in Cheek, and may be
the appropriate interpretation of “willfully” under the anti-kickback statute. The
following Section analyzes the Supreme Court’s most recent definition of “willfully”
in the context of a federal criminal statute. Whether this definition, which is a
“middle standard,” or the Hanlester/Ratzlaf “heightened standard,” is most likely to
be adopted by courts interpreting the anti-kickback statute is discussed in Section VII
below.
IV. THE SUPREME COURT’S MOST RECENT INTERPRETATION OF “WILLFUL”
A. Bryan v. United States
The Supreme Court has not addressed the meaning of “knowingly and willfully”
in the context of the anti-kickback statute. Therefore, the split in the circuit courts
continues. However, the High Court’s recent decision in Bryan v. United States,107
involving a federal firearms trafficing law, is certain to impact this debate. At issue
in Bryan was whether the Court would maintain the heightened mens rea
requirement established in Cheek/Ratzlaf, or whether a lesser mens rea standard
would support a conviction. The Court chose the latter, holding “willfully” is the
intent to do something the law forbids without knowledge of the specific law.108
In Bryan, the defendant was convicted of violating the Firearms Owners’
Protection Act (FOPA), which prohibits anyone from “willfully” violating, inter alia,
Section 922(a)(1)(A), which forbids dealing in firearms without a federal license.
The trial court evidence, which was accepted by the Supreme Court, showed that: the
defendant did not have a license to deal in firearms; he used “straw purchasers” in
Ohio to acquire hand guns; and he resold the guns on Brooklyn street corners known
for drug dealing.109 According to the Court, the evidence proved the defendant was
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dealing in firearms and that he knew that his conduct was illegal, but there was no
evidence that he was specifically aware of the federal licensing requirement.110
At trial, the defendant requested the jury be instructed that he could only be
convicted if he had actual knowledge of the federal firearms law.111 The trial judge
refused the requested jury instructions and explained that the term “willfully”
required intent to do something unlawful, but that it did not require a specific
knowledge of the law or rule alleged to have been violated.112
On appeal, the defendant raised two primary arguments in support of a
heightened mens rea requirement. First, he argued that since the statute included
three categories of acts that required “knowing” conduct, Congress must have
intended a higher standard for “willful” conduct.113 The Court found that
“knowledge” meant merely a knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense and
not knowledge of the law.114 More is required with respect to “willful” conduct,
which the Court held required a finding that the defendant “acted with an evilmeaning mind, that is to say, that he acted with knowledge that his conduct was
unlawful.”115
Second, the defendant argued that the Supreme Court’s decisions in Cheek and
Ratzlaf defined the statutory construction of “willful” as requiring specific awareness
of the law under which the defendant was charged. However, the Court
distinguished these cases as exceptions to the general rule that “ignorance of the law
is no excuse” because they were highly technical and presented the danger of
ensnaring individuals engaged in apparently innocent conduct.116 According to the
Court, this danger was not present in Bryan, as the defendant knew his conduct was
unlawful and because the FOPA statute itself was designed to protect law-abiding
citizens who inadvertently violate the law.117
In a rather strange conclusion to these primary challenges by the defendant, the
Court stated, “[t]hus, the willfulness requirement of § 924(a)(1)(D) does not carve
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Id. at 196.

111
Id. at 1944 n.10. (citing Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135 (1994), the defendant
requested that the jury instructions state that “[Y]ou must be persuaded that with the actual
knowledge of the federal firearms licensing laws Defendant acted in knowing and intentional
violation of them.”).
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118 S. Ct. at 1944, FN 11, citing App. 18-19. Specifically, the trial judge stated: “A
person acts willfully if he acts intentionally and purposely and with the intent to do something
the law forbids, that is, with the bad purpose to disobey or to disregard the law. Now, the
person need not be aware of the specific law or rule that his conduct may be violating. But he
must act with the intent to do something that the law forbids.”
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Although the defendant did not raise this issue, it should be noted that the scienter
requirements of “knowing” and “willful” were added after the fact. This is analogous to the
anti-kickback statute which also added the scienter requirement several years after the original
act was passed.
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out an exception to the traditional rule that ignorance of the law is no excuse;
knowledge that the conduct is unlawful is all that is required.”118 While it may seem
contradictory for the Court to state in the same sentence that ignorance is no excuse,
but that knowledge is required, it appears that what the Court is saying that the
defendant does not need to know the specifics of the law in order to be convicted. In
other words, it is sufficient that the defendant know that his conduct is unlawful in a
general sense.
In addition to the two primary challenges, the defendant also raised arguments
based on the legislative history of FOPA. The defendant argued that when the
scienter requirement was added to the legislation, at least some legislators
understood the term willfully as requiring that a defendant would have to know the
details of the law in order to be convicted under it. The Court rejected this argument
as the legislators cited by the defendant were in opposition to amending the
legislation, and the opposition is not an authoritative guide to the construction of the
legislation.119
Finally, the defendant argued that, at the time FOPA was passed, the lower courts
uniformly interpreted “willfulness” in other sections of the statute as a knowledge of
the law.120 The Court rejected any such uniformity among the lower courts and noted
that in each of the cases where knowledge of the law was required, it had been
established that the defendants had had a knowledge of the law when committing the
crime.121
In dissent, Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Ginsberg,
argued that the statute is ambiguous, and the presumption should be that Congress
intended a willful violation of the law to require specific knowledge of the offense.122
Scalia pointed out that the government concedes that the defendant must know that
the conduct violates the law, as the jury instructions stated that defendant “acted with
knowledge that his conduct was unlawful.”123 However, Scalia criticized the
majority for allowing any unlawful act–even one that is unrelated to the licensing
law–to stand in the place of a violation of the anti-trafficing law. For example, he
noted Mr. Bryan would be guilty of violating the anti-trafficing law based on filing
off serial numbers or using straw purchasers, even if he had never heard of the
licensing requirement. Scalia argued that the majority would convict if the defendant
“…knew that the car out of which he sold the guns was illegally double-parked, or if,
in order to meet the appointed time for sale, he intentionally violated Pennsylvania’s
speed limit on the drive back from the gun purchase in Ohio.”124 Finally, Justice
Scalia argued that there is precedence for the heightened mens rea requirement based
on the Cheek and Ratzlaf decisions.125 He disputed the majority’s explanation,
118
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however, that the higher standard applies in those cases because of the complexity of
the tax and currency laws.126 Rather, he bases the mens rea standard on the
presumption that Congress intended the word “willfully” to mean a knowledge of the
law violated.
B. The Potential Impact of Bryan
Bryan defines willfully as requiring both an evil-meaning mind, and knowledge
that the conduct is unlawful.127 The first element is satisfied by the purposeful
conduct of the defendant. The second element can be satisfied by an unlawful act,
even if the act is remotely related to the statute. As noted by the dissent, there does
not appear to be a nexus requirement between the unlawful act and the statute under
which the defendant is charged. This is evidenced by the Court’s approval of the
trial judges statement that “the government is not required to prove that the
defendant knew that a license was required, nor is the government required to prove
that he had knowledge that he was breaking the law.”128 Based on the evidence in
Bryan–straw purchases, filed-down serial numbers, and pistol sales on notoriously
high-crime street corners–there was a relationship to the federal licensing
requirement. Therefore, the rule from Bryan appears to be that a defendant can be
convicted for willfully violating a criminal statute where the defendant knowingly
and with an evil mind engages in unlawful conduct that is related to, or suggests a
knowledge of, the proscribed acts of the statute.
The Court’s definition of “willfully” in Bryan will impact the mens rea
requirements under the anti-kickback statute because it is on point with the statute.
Both statutes were amended to include a mens rea requirement of “willfully” and
both include separate definitions of “knowingly” and “willfully.” Because of these
similarities, and for the reasons discussed in Section VI below, the Bryan decision
will likely be followed in cases such as Starks. However, because the defendant’s
conduct in Bryan was done with an evil purpose and the defendant knew he was
violating a law, the case does not address situations where a defendant was mistaken
about the unlawfulness of the conduct. For example, in Hanlester, if defendants had
argued that they were aware of the anti-kickback statute, but misunderstood its
application, they would have failed to satisfy the requirement of knowing the
conduct is unlawful. Because of the unlawful conduct in Bryan, the Court does not
address this issue.
V. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT RESPONSE TO BRYAN–UNITED STATES V. STARKS
Just four months after the Supreme Court’s ruling in Bryan, the Eleventh Circuit
court was confronted with the issue of interpreting the meaning of “willfully” in
United States v. Starks,129 a case involving the anti-kickback statute. The Eleventh
Circuit was to decide whether the anti-kickback statute required the
Hanlester/Ratzlaf “heightened” mens rea standard, or whether the Bryan/Jain
126
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“middle” standard applied. In a decision that is certain to be closely scrutinized by
those interested in the debate over the scienter requirement of the anti-kickback
statute, the Eleventh Circuit adopted a “middle” culpability standard by defining
“willfully” as “the specific intent to do something that the law forbids.”130
Starks involved a kickback arrangement whereby two Florida state community
health aides were paid for referring pregnant women to Future Steps, Inc., a private
drug addiction treatment clinic.131 Future Steps was operating under a contract with
Florida CHS’s Metropolitan General Hospital.132 The contract contained a provision
explicitly forbidding Future Steps from making any payment for patient referrals in
violation of the anti-kickback statute.133 Shortly after entering into the agreement,
Future Steps was having difficulty attracting patients. When efforts to build referral
relationships failed, the president of Future Steps offered to pay the defendant
community health aides $250 for each patient they referred for inpatient treatment.
Under the referral arrangement, the health aides were paid in cash or check, usually
at a parking lot or restaurant.134
The defendants were convicted of violating the anti-kickback statute. At trial, the
district court instructed the jury that the word “willfully” means the specific intent to
act unlawfully, with a bad purpose to disobey or disregard the law.135 On appeal,
defendants claimed that the jury instructions failed to require knowledge that their
referral arrangement violated the anti-kickback statute. Relying principally on
Ratzlaf, and the Eleventh Circuit’s holding in Sanchez-Corcino,136 defendants argued
that a heightened mens rea standard applied in cases where the statute required a
“willful” violation of the law.
Based on Bryan, the Eleventh Circuit rejected Ratzlaf and its own prior holding
in Sanchez-Corcino in denying the petitioner’s appeal. The court distinguished
Ratzlaf on the basis that the anti-kickback statute “is not a highly technical tax or
financial regulation that poses the danger of ensnaring persons engaged in apparently
innocent activity,”137 and Sanchez-Corcino was specifically overruled in Bryan.138
The trial court’s definition of “willfully” in Starks was almost identical to the
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definition that the Supreme Court approved in Bryan. This definition is consistent
with the “middle” standard definitions adopted by the Fifth and Eighth Circuit
courts.
Proponents of Hanlester will take issue with the Starks decision for several
reasons. First, the court quickly dismissed the anti-kickback statute as not being
highly technical like the tax (Cheek) and financial regulation (Ratzlaf) statutes that
call for the heightened standard. According to the Eleventh Circuit, “the giving or
taking of kickbacks for medical referrals is hardly the sort of activity a person might
expect to be legal.”139 The court’s reasoning that kickbacks are malum in se, rather
than malum prohibitum, oversimplifies the complexity of modern health care
remuneration arrangements, and underestimates the potential for becoming
innocently engaged in prohibited transactions. Furthermore, the Starks court appears
to base its conclusion about the complexity of the anti-kickback statute on the facts
of the case at hand. For example, the court pointed out the referral arrangements
directly affected the counseling of the pregnant women who relied on the counselors
for help,140 and the defendant health aides threatened to take away indigent womens’
babies if they did not receive treatment from Future Steps.141 While these acts are
malum in se, they should not be read into the court’s interpretation of the scienter
requirements of the statute. The meaning of “willfully” under the law should stand
independent of the facts of the case.
In addition to the fact that the Starks defendants knew that they were acting
unlawfully, the defendant, Future Steps, was also aware of the anti-kickback law
through its contract with the hospital.142 Because Future Steps engaged in the
unlawful activity that was expressly prohibited in the contract, it is questionable
whether they would have escaped conviction even under the heightened mens rea
standard. Such unsympathetic defendants are hardly the type that make a good case
for a more rigorous scienter standard.
The Starks/Bryan mens rea standard is similar to the “middle” culpability
standard in Jain, Davis, and Neufeld. This standard represents the majority view of
the meaning of “willfully” under the anti-kickback statute, but does not overrule the
“heightened” standard established in Hanlester/Ratzlaf. Because both Supreme
Court cases were interpreting the meaning of the “willful” under different criminal
statutes, and because the Court has never interpreted the mens rea requirement of the
anti-kickback statute, courts are able to adopt whichever standard they choose.
However, for the reasons discussed below, the Bryan “middle” standard is most
likely to be followed in cases involving the mens rea of the anti-kickback statute.
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VI. ANALYSIS OF THE ANTI-KICKBACK MENS REA STANDARDS
A. Understanding the Alternative Standards
As the Supreme Court noted in Bryan, the mens rea term “willful” is “a word of
many meanings.”143 As described in Section III, these meanings generally fall into
one of three definitions: a lesser degree of culpability that merely requires the
person to act “knowingly,” a middle standard that requires intent to violate the law or
the showing of an “evil purpose,” and a heightened standard of culpability that
requires knowledge of the law coupled with the intent to violate the law. In
interpreting “willfully” in the context of the anti-kickback statute, federal courts have
generally adopted either the middle standard or the heightened mens rea standard.
No federal court appears to have adopted the lesser degree of culpability. This is
likely because the anti-kickback statute contains the phrase “knowingly and
willfully,” and were a court to give the same meaning to both terms, “willfully”
would be mere surplusage.144
While the definitions for the middle standard and heightened standard often
appear to be very similar, they are very different in application. The following
hypothetical will help to illustrate the differences between these definitions.
Suppose a representative from a pharmaceutical company approaches a physician
and invites her to participate in a research project for a new allergy medication.
Under terms of the agreement, the physician agrees to record a series of utilization
outcomes of her patients using (and purchasing) the medication and to share the
results with the pharmaceutical company. In exchange for the doctor’s time and
efforts in recording the patient data and agreeing to the share the results, the
physician will receive a research stipend.
Under the first interpretation of “willfully,” the physician would be liable for
violating the anti-kickback statute merely because she knew that she was receiving
remuneration in return for medication that she ordered for her patients.145 Despite
the fact that the physician was unaware of the anti-kickback law or that such a
stipend would be considered remuneration, she will still be liable for knowingly
accepting the payment. The common law principle that ignorance of the law is not a
defense will impose upon her the presumption that she knows the law.146 Therefore,
since she knowingly accepted the stipend money under this scenario, she will be
liable for violation of the anti-kickback statute under the first interpretation of
willfully.147
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Under the second interpretation, the government must prove that the physician
had the intent to violate the law or entered into the agreement with an evil motive.
The intent to violate the law is a question of fact that will be decided upon the
evidence presented at trial. Under the present hypothetical, it is unclear whether the
physician entered into the agreement innocently, or whether there was intent to
violate the law or an evil motive. If the physician could prove she did not consider
the stipend to be remuneration, then she would not be liable under the anti-kickback
law. For example, if she could demonstrate that she did not increase the volume of
prescriptions of the medication under the study, or that she honestly believed that her
work was contributing to legitimate research in her field, she would not likely be
convicted under the anti-kickback statute. However, if the government could prove
that the physician knew that the stipend was really an inducement to increase
utilization of the medication, or that she attempted to conceal the payment because it
might be wrongful, then she would likely be guilty of violating the anti-kickback
statute under the second interpretation of the mens rea requirement.
Under the third interpretation of “willfully,” the physician would be liable only if
the government could meet the heightened standard of proving that she violated a
known legal duty. This is a difficult requirement to meet, as it requires proof that the
physician knew the anti-kickback law. In cases where this standard has been
adopted, the courts have generally stated that the accused need not know the
specifics of the law, but must be shown to at least know of the law.148 Under this
standard, the government might win a conviction if, for example, she knew of the
anti-kickback law through training from her practice group or if she were practicing
under a managed care contract that specifically forbid such agreements. Short of
some showing of actual knowledge of the anti-kickback statute, it will be difficult for
the physician in this example to be found liable for violating the law under the third
interpretation of “willfully.”
B. Why Federal Courts Will Likely Follow Bryan in Anti-Kickback Cases
The Supreme Court’s recent interpretation of “willfully” in Bryan will likely be
adopted by federal courts interpreting the scienter requirement of the anti-kickback
statute. Even before the Court had reached its final outcome in that case, it was
anticipated to have a “dramatic” impact on future anti-kickback litigation.149 Based
on the Eleventh Circuit’s adoption of Bryan in United States v. Starks, this prediction
is already coming true. There are several reasons why the Bryan decision is likely to
be followed in the context of the anti-kickback statute.
First, Bryan is consistent with the general interpretation of “willfully.” While the
word “willfully” has many different meanings, it is most commonly defined as a
“bad purpose” or “intending to violate the law.”150 This definition is consistent with
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the common law understanding of the word151 and modern statutory construction.152
The Bryan decision is also consistent with the majority view of the interpretation of
willfully under the anti-kickback statute. The Eighth Circuit court in Jain, the Fifth
Circuit court in Davis, and the Eleventh Circuit court in Starks have all adopted this
standard. This standard requires proof that the person knew his conduct was
wrongful and chose to act contrary to the law. Furthermore, Bryan is also consistent
with the general principle that ignorance of the law is not a defense.
Second, the heightened mens rea standard is intended to be limited to instances
where a person might become innocently ensnared in a technical area of the law.
Circuit Courts have split as to whether the anti-kickback statute qualifies as a highly
technical area of the law. In Hanlester, the Ninth Circuit court considered the antikickback statute to be highly technical. However, the Eleventh Circuit court
disagreed, claiming that the statute was not highly technical. Interestingly, the facts
in each of these cases may have influenced the court’s reading of the statute.
Hanlester involved a complicated kickback arrangement, whereas Starks involved a
strait-forward kickback scenario. However, courts should not selectively change the
mens rea standard based on the facts of the case.
Even if the anti-kickback statute is considered to be highly technical, health care
providers can avoid becoming innocently ensnared in its technicalities by requesting
an advisory opinion. Under the HIPAA, the Secretary of the Department of Health
and Human Services (HHS) is required to issue advisory opinions in response to
requests for guidance about whether a specific business arrangement violates the
anti-kickback law.153 The Secretary must issue an advisory opinion within 60 days
of the receipt of a request, and the opinion is binding on both the Secretary and the
party requesting the opinion.154 Thus, if a health care professional is in doubt, he or
she can quickly receive clarification about a proposed financial arrangement.
Third, the heightened mens rea standard presents a very difficult burden on the
government. Because this standard requires proof that the person actually knew of
the anti-kickback law, it is very difficult for the government to win a conviction.
Since this standard grossly favors defendants, courts will likely rely on the Bryan
decision as a more balanced definition of “willfully.” Another reason that courts
may find to reject the heightened standard is that it is unclear how much the person
must know about the law. In cases where this standard has been applied, courts have
151
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stated that the person must know something of the law, but is not required to know
the specifics of the law. Such an ambiguous standard will be difficult to apply where
the facts do not present a clear picture of what a person knows.
Fourth, the gun trafficing statute in Bryan is analogous to the anti-kickback
statute in that both statutes include the mens rea terms “knowingly” and “willfully.”
The Supreme Court defined both of these terms in Bryan, and noted that “willfully”
requires more than “knowingly,” since the person must also know that the conduct is
unlawful.155 This distinction is important because critics of the “middle standard”
have argued that it proscribes the same conduct as knowingly, and therefore, courts
have failed to recognize that it is a higher standard.156
VII. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s recent opinion in Bryan will likely have a dramatic
influence on federal courts’ interpretation of the mens rea requirement under the
Medicare and Medicaid anti-kickback statute. Although the Bryan decision defined
“willfully” under a different federal criminal statute, it has already been relied upon
by the Eleventh Circuit court in interpreting the anti-kickback statute. However, the
Court was careful not to overrule the heightened mens rea standard it approved in
Cheeks and Ratzlaf. In so doing, the Court did not eliminate the possibility that the
anti-kickback statute could be read as requiring a heightened standard, as the Ninth
Circuit court did in Hanlester. Therefore, Bryan will significantly influence the
debate about the appropriate scienter requirement, but will not completely settle it.
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